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The question of the status of armed 
forces abroad presents a problem to the 
United States only because this era has 
seen, for the first time, the stationing of 
our troops on foreign sovereign soil for 
lengthy periods-in peacetime. The im-
pact of this situation is, of course, 
greater on the Army and Air Force than 
upon the Navy, which is more accus-
tomed to sailing foreign seas, and which 
has fewer personnel ashore. Neverthe-
less, a multitude of problems confronts 
all our forces in the wake of the policy 
of the United States that the interests of 
this country are best served with a 
security system of allied nations, each 
contributing toward common defense 
goals and each at the same time remain-
ing politically and economically stable. 
Because of the independent political 
stature of these nations, our armed 
forces stationed abroad must not be 
considered as occupying forces-
although Communist "Ami, Go Home" 
propaganda would have the world think 
so. They are present with the consent of 
the local government and can legally 
remain there only with that consent. 
The rights and duties of our forces in 
these countries are normally spelled out 
in agreements of varying scope-and it is 
these status of forces arrangements 
which I will discuss, with emphasis on 
problems of jurisdiction. 
Our military, air and naval forces are 
permanently stationed in foreign juris-
diction in several capacities: 
First: the Mission groups most fre-
quently found in South and Central 
America consisting of advisors who re-
main subject to United States military 
law and who are subject only in some 
instances to local jurisdiction. Their 
privileges and immunities are specified 
in the various Mission Agreements. 
Second: MAAG personnel, function-
ing under our Mutual Defense Assis-
tance Agreements, who enjoy full diplo-
matic immunity in some cases, and are 
subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of 
the United States and of the local 
jurisdiction in others. Generally, MAAG 
personnel are assigned to the United 
States Embassy and receive privileges of 
personnel of corresponding rank in the 
diplomatic mission. 
Third: Members of the International 
Military Headquarters of NATO who 
receive privileges and immunities as 
specified in the applicable NATO Agree-
ments, particularly the Headquarters 
Protocol. 
Fourth: Forces in such places as the 
Ryukyu Islands, which, although not 
United States territory, are subject only 
to the jurisdictional control of the 
United States. . 
Fifth, and most important: Ordinary 
forces stationed in nations allied with 
the United States-performing garrison 
duty, maintaining defense installations, 
or performing logistical. tasks. The ques-
tion of the legal status of this largest 
group-military personnel, civilian 
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employees and dependents-and its re-
lationship to the local authorities is the 
source of the problem I am to discuss 
today. 
A demand for extraterritorial rights-
that is, complete immunity from local 
jurisdiction-is often impossible in light 
of the extreme sensitivity of the host 
government towards such arrangements. 
However, we have been able to secure in 
some countries-such as the Philippines 
and Saudi Arabia-the right to use and 
occupy specific areas in a manner that 
is, in many ways, extraterritoriaL 
Rights as extensive as these, however, 
can not always be secured. The spectre 
of colonialism and imperialism is a 
frightening one to many of our allies 
and extraterritoriality is envisaged as a 
symbol of exploited peoples. Agree-
ments guiding the relationship between 
our armed forces and the authorities of 
the receiving state are therefore in-
dispensable. These arrangements differ 
in their details because of varying condi-
tions in host countries. Account must 
be taken of the number of forces to be 
stationed, their composition, their par-
ticular mission, and the law of the host 
country. The situation in Italy is illus-
trative of the necessity for an agreement 
with the national government. Italy has 
not ratified the NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement. As a result, our forces there 
must operate with informal local agree-
ments which have doubtful standing, 
and under the law miscreants can, in 
most instances, expect trial only in 
Italian courts. 
The Status of Forces arrangements 
which bring some order into this seem-
ing chaos have three principal purposes. 
They are designed to reduce to the 
fullest extent possible the administrative 
burden of the commanders of the forces 
by limiting local interference; second, to 
reduce the area of possible dispute with 
the host countries; and, thirdly, to 
protect the rights and property of mem-
bers of the forces and the inhabitants of 
the host country. Underlying these 
purposes is the principle that these 
agreements must enhance the mission of 
the forces in the regional arrangement 
concerned. For example, the forces 
must be free to move, when required, 
across national frontiers without undue 
restriction. This is particularly neces-
sary, of course, in Europe. 
Most of these agreements have been 
negotiated during a period of peace. 
During time of war, the mission of the 
forces is of such importance that rights 
normally considered basic can be sur-
rendered or waived by the host country 
with no loss of national prestige. An 
example of this can be seen in the 
Korean conflict, where an exchange of 
notes on 12 July 1950 provided that 
United States courts-martial would exer-
cise exclusive jurisdiction over all mem-
bers of United States forces for all 
offenses. 
The Status of Forces Agreement, on 
the other hand, negotiated among the 
NATO nations, is primarily designed as 
a peacetime agreement. It contains a 
provision that upon the outbreak of 
hostilities its claims provisions will not 
apply to war damage, and that with 60 
days' notice any provision of the agree-
ment can be suspended. The Agreement 
with Japan is similar. Some Forces 
Agreements include a provision that in 
the case of war, exclusive criminal juris-
diction for all offenses will rest in the 
United States. 
Several jurisdictional agreements 
have been negotiated within the frame-
work of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Three of these were sub-
mitted to, and have been ratified by, the 
Senate. One agreement gives the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization a juridical 
personality and enumerates rights and 
privileges of the persons attached to the 
Organization. Generally, international 
representatives of the internal staff, 
most of whom are civilians, receive the 
same privileges as are accorded to 
similar persons in the United Nations 
and in the Organization of American 
States. The second NATO Agreement is 
the Headquarters Protocol to the Status 
of Forces Agreement, which gives inter-
national military headquarters such as 
SHAPE and SACLANT and the Channel 
Command juridical personality and 
enumerates the rights and duties of its 
personnel. The Status of Forces Agree-
ment (in shorthand-NATO SOF) is the 
third of these NATO subsidiary agree-
ments, and it concerns itself with the 
rights and duties of the ordinary mili-
tary forces, the civilian components, 
and their dependents, and contains ex-
tensive provisions guiding the jurisdic-
tional prerogatives of both the sending 
and receiving states. 
While these NATO agreements are 
more extensive than those which we 
have negotiated with other countries, 
they reflect the problems we meet 
around the world.' In summary, the 
provisions of NATO SOF can be out-
lined as follows insofar as jurisdiction is 
concerned: 
In a few rare cases the sending 
state-that is, the United States in the 
cases of our forces abroad-has exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction. For example, 
where an act is a violation of United 
States law but not of the law of the host 
country, the United States has exclusive 
jurisdiction. Conversely, the receiving 
state has exclusive jurisdiction in some 
instances. This is over acts which are 
offenses against the local law but not 
the law of the sending state. These are 
generally security offenses, espionage, et 
cetera. 
For the most part, the Agreement 
provides a system of concurrent jurisdic-
tion. This is the nub of the setup. If the 
offense is committed by a member of 
the visiting forces and is solely against 
the property or security of the sending 
state, or if the offense is solely against 
the person or property of another mem-
ber of the force or civilian component 
or of a dependent of that state, or if the 
offense arises out of any act or omission 
done in the performance of official 
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duty, then the jurisdiction of the send-
ing state is deemed primary. They have 
the first right to try. 
In all other cases the host or re-
ceiving state has the first right to try, 
and this category includes the 
ubiquitous breach of peace and traffic 
offense. Once the accused is tried by 
one state, he can not be tried in the 
same country for the same offense by 
the other state. The authorities of the 
state having the primary right to exer-
cise jurisdiction are required to give 
"sympathetic consideration" to requests 
for a waiver of jurisdiction hy the other 
state, in important cases. 
In trials before courts of the re-
ceiving state, definite rights must be 
accorded for the protection of the 
accused. He is entitled to a prompt and 
speedy trial; he must be informed in 
advance of the charges against him; he 
has the right to confront witnesses; he 
has the right to a competent interpreter 
and to legal counsel; and, finally, to 
communicate with his government. In 
every case arisen so far where a person 
subject to our military law has .been 
tried in a foreign court, an observer 
from the armed forces-usually a 
lawyer-has been present to note the 
proceedings and render a report. If it is 
considered that a criminal proceeding 
has resulted in a denial of justice, or 
that a member of the forces has not 
received proper procedural treatment, 
diplomatic overtures will be made to 
secure redress. The Senate, in ratifying 
the Status of Forces Agreement, stated 
that a waiver of jurisdiction should be 
sought wherever there is a danger that 
the accused will not be protected be-
cause of the absence or denial of consti-
tutional rights he would enjoy in the 
United States. If the waiver is denied, 
the Senate has directed that the com~ 
man ding officer shall request the De-
partment of State to press the request 
through diplomatic channels. The 
Attorney General in the paper before 
you expresses the view that these 
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criminal jurisdictional arrangements 
afford the soldier greater protection 
than he would enjoy without them. 
Each of the services maintains an 
up-to-date record of the actual opera-
tion of these criminal jurisdictiOlial ar-
rangements, and reports thereon are 
rendered regularly to the Congress, 
which has shown great interest in these 
treaties and agreements. 
There is nothing like a series of 
scintillating statistics to bring any 
audience to its knees. Realizing this, I 
am going to give you only five sets 
which point up our worldwide ex-
perience. 
During the period from 1 December 
1954 to 31 May 1955, four thousand 
four hundred and fifty-eight (4,458) 
persons subject to United States mili-
tary law were accused of offenses which 
fell under the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts. A waiver of jurisdiction was 
obtained from the foreign authorities in 
66.2% of these cases. One thousand two 
hundred and fifty-eight (1,258) persons 
were tried by foreign tribunals during 
this six-months period, and of these 
only one hundred and forty-one (141) 
could be considered serious offenders. It 
is particularly interesting to note that 
sentences to confinement were actually 
imposed-not suspended-in only fifty-
one (51) cases during this period. 
Perhaps the most notorious case 
seized upon by the press is that of 
Privates Richard Keefe and Anthony 
Scaletti. Sad tales have been told of how 
these lads, engaging in a boyish prank, 
seized a taxi and went joyriding. For 
this they were reportedly sentenced to 
five years in solitary confinement in a 
'small cell in France, where they have 
been ignored and forgotten by their 
countrymen. 
The facts are somewhat different. 
Keefe and Scaletti, each of whom had 
an impressive record of courts-martial, 
met in a stockade in Germany. After 
being released from the guardhouse, 
they went AWOL again into France, got 
drunk in Orleans, and, deciding to go to 
Paris, hailed a taxi. Upon leaving 
Orleans, they stopped the cab and beat 
and choked the sixty-five year old 
driver, leaving him beside the road. His 
injuries were so severe that he was 
incapacitated for about a month. After 
this demonstration of boyish glee, Keefe 
and Scaletti, with the cab, went to Paris, 
where they were arrested several days 
later. The French refused our request to 
waive jurisdiction and Keefe and 
Scaletti were tried by the Assizes Court 
in Orleans on 27 October 1953. They 
were charged with having stolen a 
vehicle, during the night, on a public 
highway, with violence. A French at-
torney was appointed by the French 
court to represent them, and they were 
tried jointly before a' jury of seven 
persons. The French Penal Code pro-
vides that one who is guilty of theft 
under these circumstances may be 
punished at hard labor for life. Sen-
tences against French persons for of-
fenses similar to that committed by 
Keefe and Scaletti have ranged from ten 
years to life, and, even in the light of 
these sentences, French taxi drivers not 
long ago staged a nation-wide, one-hour 
protest strike because of the light sen-
tences given to persons who robbed or 
attacked cab drivers. Although not re-
quired to testify, Keefe and Scaletti 
confessed their crimes before the 
French court and were sentenced to five 
years' imprisonment. This was later 
reduced by six months and they will be 
eligible for parole next month, two 
years later. The American observer at 
the trial stated that in his opinion the 
trial was fair and that no rights guaran-
teed by the NATO Status Forces Agree-
ment, or usually enjoyed under Ameri-
can law, were denied them. 
Keefe and Scaletti are presently con-
fined in a French prison, where they are 
periodically visited by Army authorities. 
No reason for complaint has been found, 
and both men recently freely expressed 
satisfaction with their treatment. 
This case had an impact in United 
States courts because Keefe's wife 
applied for a writ of habeas corpus. The 
courts denied release, holding that they 
had no jurisdiction. Although the courts 
did not decide on constitutional 
grounds, they did note that the French 
proceedings were reportedly fair. The 
Supreme Court recently denied 
certiorari. 
Thus far, only one case has been 
reported in which the full formal pro-
cedure called for in the Senate Resolu-
tion has been invoked; i.e., report to 
Congress and diplomatic protest. This 
case arose in France and involved one 
Private First Class Jerry Baldwin, who 
was found guilty of an assault upon a 
French national by a French court at 
Orleans on October 7, 1953 and sen-
tenced to pay a fine of 6,000 francs, or 
about $18.00. In view of the fact that 
the accused had not been confronted 
with witnesses against him, as required 
by the Status of Forces Agreement, a 
protest was made to the French 
Ministry of Justice. The Ministry ac-
cordingly directed that the sentence of 
the court be appealed by the Public 
Prosecutor. Baldwin appeared in person 
at the appeal, represented by a qualified 
French attorney. No witnesses ap-
peared, and the evidence was presented 
in the same manner as at the trial; that 
is, by heresay. Private Baldwin re-
iterated his denial of the offense 
charged against him. The Prosecutor 
failed to advise the Appellate Court of 
the specific reason for the appeal by the 
Ministry of Justice, and, since as a rule 
such appeals are ordered by the Ministry 
only in cases where the sentence 
adjudged by the lower courts was con-
sidered inadequate, the Court of 
Appeals confirmed the lower court's 
conviction of Private Baldwin, and in-
creased the fine to 12,000 francs. This 
bit of confusion thoroughly dis-
concerted everyone, and a new protest 
was made to the Ministry of Justice 
through the United States Embassy in 
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Paris. The Ministry of Justice then 
remitted the fine against Private Bald-
win and instructed the prosecutor to 
insure the avoidance of similar errors in 
the future. The French Foreign Office 
has expressed its regret for the repeti-
tion of error on the part of the Appel-
late Court. Private Baldwin, with his 
fine remitted, desired that no further 
appeal be taken. 
The effect of a waiver of jurisdiction 
by the foreign authorities raises one 
thorny problem which still plagues us. 
In November, 1953, an Air Force 
officer was involved in an automobile 
accident in France and a Canadian 
officer, who was a passenger in the car, 
was killed. Pursuant to the request of 
the appropriate United States com-
mander, French authorities waived their 
primary right to exercise jurisdiction in 
this case. Thereafter, following formal 
investigation under the provisions of 
Article 32 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, the "senior officer 
present" in France delivered a written 
finding to the effect that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant court-
martial action against the officer. Based 
on this finding, the Air Force officer's 
automobile insurance company refused 
the widow's demands for compensation. 
She thereupon initiated a personal 
action against the officer, under the 
French Code, which permits its courts 
to consider an action to adjudicate both 
criminal and civil liability. 
The Air Force officer was tried and 
convicted of involuntary homicide and 
was sentenced to pay a fine and 
damages. During the trial, it was argued 
that France had waived its right to 
exercise jurisdiction. The court held, 
however, that the waiver by the public 
prosecutor did not deprive an individual 
of his rights under the French Consti-
tution to initiate a personal action 
against another; that the court must 
entertain such action and determine 
both criminal and civil liability; and that 
waivers of jurisdiction are valid only in 
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cases in which third persons would have 
no cause of action for civil and criminal 
redress. 
With respect to the double jeopardy 
provjsion of the NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement, the court held that the 
considerations of the commanding 
officer and his decision not to court-
martial were administrative determina-
tions without judicial significance as 
they did not put a defendant in 
jeopardy, and, as such, did not preclude 
action on the offense by the court. 
International wrestling, in an effort to 
solve this dilemma, still continues. 
The overall picture of these arrange-
ments has, I believe, been obscured by 
an intense and generally uninformed 
concern over the criminal jurisdictional 
provisions. Criminal jurisdiction is a 
subject of only one article among 
twenty in the Status of Forces Agree-
ment-just one of the questions which 
must be answered. 
Matters of taxation are very com-
plex. What local taxes may the visiting 
force legitimately be required to pay, 
and to what extent should members of 
the forces be required to pay taxes? The 
Status of Forces Agreement considers in 
some detail the tax liability of indi-
vidual members of the forces, civilian 
component and their dependents. 
Article X, for example, provides in 
effect that for purposes of taxation no 
member of the forces or civilian com-
ponent shall be deemed a resident or 
domiciliary of the receiving state. This is 
quite clear, but difficulties arise because 
some taxes of the receiving state may 
fall upon persons whether they be resi-
dents or not. Generally, we can not 
complain when the tax is of the same 
general nature as those normally im-
posed upon service personnel while sta-
tioned in this country. Included are 
taxes imposed to supply services ren-
dered to the forces, such as water 
supply, sewerage, street lighting, and 
electricity. But there are many other 
examples of taxes which it is clear our 
personnel should not pay. This includes 
income taxes, personal property taxes 
and inheritance taxes. In negotiating 
status arrangements with other coun-
tries, therefore-and you would be 
amazed how many military man hours 
go into this pastime (one day it may be 
you)-it is necessary to contemplate the 
type of taxes which our people should 
not be required to pay. There is no easy 
solution. Patient negotiation with the 
host country is almost invariably re-
quired, together with a careful examina-
tion of foreign tax laws. 
Status of Forces arrangements must 
consider customs and duties. The host 
country is anxious to prevent so-called 
luxury goods from falling into the local 
economy, where they are likely to 
disrupt trade and encourage black-
market operation. Controls are there-
fore necessary, as well as exemptions. 
Article XI meets some of these difficul-
ties by providing an exemption upon 
personal effects, private vehicles, and 
other goods imported for the use of 
members of the forces and their de-
pendents. These goods can be imported 
free of customs, but they can not be 
disposed of on the local market. Of 
course equipment, provisions and 
ordinary supplies for the use of the 
armed services them~elves are imported 
free of duty. 
Besides taxation and customs prob-
lems there arises the ever-present matter 
of claims. Compensation should be pro-
vided for physical damage to property 
in the receiving state. However, since 
the visiting forces are present for mutual 
defense, the burden must be borne by 
both the sending and receiving state. 
Therefore, the Status of Forces Agree-
ment provides that the receiving state 
shall waive smaller claims for damage to 
certain property. In questionable cases, 
the parties have agreed to abide by the 
decision of an arbitrator. A particularly 
interesting provision states that costs 
incurred in satisfying both public and 
private claims for damages caused by 
the forces of the sending state shall be 
chargeable 25% to the receiving state 
and 75% to the sending state. This 
arrangement, also found in the Agree-
ment with Japan, is designed to dis-
courage a multitude of specious claims. 
The claims arrangement, I might add, 
functions so smoothly we hardly know 
it is there. 
Jurisdictional agreements must also 
contemplate many questions surround-
ing the use and employment of local 
labor, the extent to which the forces 
must comply with local labor legisla-
tion, processing of employment claims, 
status of employment of nonappro-
priated fund activities (are they mem-
bers of the civilian component?)-all 
these are ever·present questions. 
Other problems include the status of 
the nonappropriated fund activities 
themselves, nongovernmental agencies 
such as the Red Cross, United States 
universities with troop educational pro-
grams, and like institutions. The Agree-
ment touches visas, drivers' licenses, and 
currency control laws as well. 
These Forces Agreements are an in-
novation for us, and their only true test 
is how they actually work. It has been 
the Army's position that by and large 
they are working well, although they 
have their growing pains and may have 
more. They do not provide answers for 
every problem, but they do constitute a 
base upon which to proceed. To make 
them work, good will and effort at the 
local level are required. It has been our 
experience that most foreign officials 
are as eager as we to eliminate sources 
of friction, especially in the inflam-
mable field of criminal jurisdiction. For 
example, at our request Japanese au-
thorities have arranged to confine in one 
modern Tokyo jail all United States 
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prisoners -convicted in Japanese courts. 
In Luxembourg, where we have no 
troops but where many of our service 
people rent houses, local arrangements 
have been concluded by which these 
persons are treated as though members 
of the forces-not as tourists or itiner-
ants. In Turkey, the primary jurisdiction 
of United States authorities has been 
extended to include all persons subject 
to United States military law, except 
United States contractors and Turkish 
residents. 
Although statistics indicate that 
these status agreements are working well, 
we do not feel that we can be com-
placent. It is the duty of the services to 
assure to all personnel a fair trial and fair 
treatment. This must not be adversely 
affected by their being subjected to the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts. 
If my remarks have had a tone about 
them which smacks of the defensive, I 
ask your indulgence. For the past 
several months, I have been a member 
of the Department of Defense team 
which has been opposing the plethora of 
bills in Congress (more than a dozen) 
which would call for our withdrawal 
from any treaty which permits 
American servicemen to be tried by a 
foreign court. Yet, these agreements are 
the basic charter under which we carry 
out our global strategy. Without them, 
our overseas bases could not exist. They 
are of utmost importance to the stra-
tegic and tactical programs which you 
must devise and implement. They are 
the law. We might wish they were more 
favorable to the United States, but they 
represent joint action by the allies. It is 
in our interest, as military men, to see 
that they work-that they provide an 
effective bridge with our allies, not a 
wall against them. 
----- '¥ -----
